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Abstract
In this paper I ask whether a model of firm capital accumulation
with entry and exit calibrated to match the investment regularities of
U.S. establishments is capable of generating the dependence of firm
dynamics on size and age. Firms face uncertainty in the form of id-
iosyncratic productivity shocks and are subject to non-convex capital
adjustment costs. I solve for the stationary equilibrium to show that
the model can account for the simultaneous dependence of industry
dynamics on size (once we condition on age) and on age (once we con-
dition on size).
JEL D21, E22, G11.
1 Introduction
It is well documented that non-convexities and irreversibility play a
central role in the investment process. The primary basis for this view,
is plant level evidence of a non-linear relationship between investment
and measures of fundamentals, including investment bursts as well as
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periods of inaction1. Moreover, Doms and Dunne (1994) discover that
smaller plants have higher maximum growth rate and larger maximum
investment shares than the largest plants. That is, as plant size in-
creases, investment expenditures become smoother. Empirically, the
investment behavior of firms is characterized by the following facts:
(i) The investment rate distribution is non-normal having a consid-
erable mass around zero.
(ii) The investment rate distribution has fat tails and is highly skewed
to the right.
(iii) Long periods of inaction are complemented by rather intensive
adjustment of the capital stock.
Furthermore, empirical studies have shown that firm size and growth
are not independent for manufacturing firms in the U.S.. Evans (1987)
and Hall(1987) show that the growth rate of employment of manufac-
turing firms, and the volatility of growth is negatively related to firm
size and age. Dunne et al. (1988) study the U.S. manufacturing plants
and show that the output of an entrant is considerably smaller than
an average incumbent. These findings are important because Gri-
brat’s Law, which states that firm size and growth are independent,
was widely used in the firms’ dynamics literature (see for example the
influential model of the size distribution of firms by Lucas (1978)).
Evans (1987) also finds that firm growth decreases with firm age and
that this relation is valid after conditioning on firms’ size. Second,
it examines the relationship between firm growth and firm size and
observes that firm growth decreases with firm size even when firms’
age is held constant. Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996) show that
the rates of job creation and job destruction in U.S. manufacturing
plants are decreasing in age and size and that conditional on the ini-
tial size, small establishments grow faster than large firms. Thus, as
pointed by Cooley and Quadrini (2001) the empirical regularities2 of
1Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) documented this facts at the plant level and Becker
et. al. (2005) at a higher level of aggregation.
2Some of these empirical facts are shown using establishment data while others corre-
spond to firm-level data. However, many of the empirical facts based on firm data also
hold for single-unit establishments (i.e. establishments that are firms) and small estab-
lishments (see Evans (1987)). Moreover, a recent study by Rossi-Hansberg and Wright
(2006) showed that the firm and establishment size distributions are similar, reflecting the
fact that only the very largest firms possess more than a single plant. This paper focuses
on the technology of a single production unit and does not address questions of ownership
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firm dynamics are:
(i) Firm growth decreases with firm age and size.
(ii) The variability of firm growth decreases with firm age and size.
(iii) Job creation and destruction3 decreases with firm age and size.
(iv) Size dependence and age dependence:
• Size dependence: Conditional on age, the dynamics of firms
(growth, volatility of growth and job creation and destruc-
tion) are negatively related to the size of firms;
• Age dependence: Conditional on size, the dynamics of firms
(growth, volatility of growth and job creation and destruc-
tion) are negatively related to the age of firms.
It seems natural to link patterns of firm growth and job reallocation
with their capital accumulation decision. In this paper, I ask whether
a model of capital accumulation with entry and exit parameterized to
match the investment characteristics of manufacturing firms is capable
of generating also the size and the age dependence.
The results of the paper can be summarized as follows. First,
I show that in the stationary equilibrium a model of firm dynamics
with entry and exit can capture the features of the investment behav-
ior cited above. In particular, I observe that the model investment rate
distribution has a considerable mass around zero, that smaller firms
invest more and that as plant size increases, investment expenditures
become smoother. I then show that the combination of a standard
model of investment with adjustment costs and the introduction of
entry and exit can generate the simultaneous dependence of industry
dynamics on size (once we condition on age) and on age (once we
condition on size). Hence, there is no conclusive evidence that finan-
cial frictions are a necessary condition to replicate the age and size
dependence.
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) were the first to capture the size and
age dependence, linking the patterns of firm growth with their fi-
nancial decisions. They introduce financial frictions in a basic model
of industry dynamics with idiosyncratic productivity shocks and in-
stantly adjustable capital and labor. In the absence of financial fric-
or control.
3Following Davis et. at. (1996) job creation is defined as the sum of employment gains
of expanding firms and job destruction is the sum of employment losses of contracting
firms.
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tions the exogenous productivity shock fully characterize the size and
dynamics of the firm and the model does not reproduce all the stylized
facts stated before. With financial frictions, the size of the firm also
depends on its equity. They motivate the introduction of financial
frictions by pointing to the relation of investment rates to Tobin’s Q
and cash flows. However, there are theoretical arguments and empir-
ical evidence showing that investment-cash flows sensitivities are not
good indicators of financing constraints or financial frictions (see for
example, Gomes (2001), Cooper and Ejarque (2003) and Kaplan and
Zingales (2000)). Moreover, the dynamics of the model are driven
by the assumption that new entrants are of the highest productivity
level contradicting the fact that entrants begin less capital-intensive
and less profitable than incumbents. Finally, in Cooley and Quadrini
(2001), firms’ capital dynamics are at odds with the investment be-
havior observed in the data.
In the model studied in this paper, the main friction is the presence
of capital adjustment costs. The literature on capital accumulation
has found that the standard assumptions of the neoclassical model of
the firm, such as strictly convex adjustment costs and reversibility, fail
to adequately explain the investment behavior (see Abel and Eberly
(1994, 1996), Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger (1995), Caballero and
Engel (1999), Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), Cooper, Haltiwanger
and Power (1999), Doms and Dunne (1994) for example). Motivated
by the disappointing empirical evidence, other economists have ar-
gue in favor of the existence of non-convexities. The sources of the
speculated non-convexities in the cost of capital adjustment include
decreasing returns, the cost of the equipment, costs associated with
disruption and installation costs. The adjustment cost function in the
model includes not only the traditional convex cost term but also a
non-convex cost of investment associated with the level of profitabil-
ity in periods of adjustment. The model still reproduces the relation
between cash flows and investment rates that is cited as evidence of
financial constraints. However, explicit financial constraints are not
necessary to obtain this result.
Firms are characterized by its capital stock and productivity level.
The optimal decision rules and the evolution of the idiosyncratic shocks
generate an endogenous distribution of establishment across capital,
productivity and age. The size dependence derives from the standard
conditions of optimal investment and labor decisions in this environ-
ment, that is an abundance of capital leads to low rates of return
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and slower accumulation. On the contrary, a relatively small stock of
capital leads to higher returns and lower variability of future profits
deriving in higher investment rates. Hence, small firms will grow faster
than large firms. The age dependence is driven by the technological
composition of firms in each age class. The distribution of entrants
and the persistence of the productivity level play an decisive role. As
a cohort of entrants gets older the persistence parameter defines how
fast the distribution of this firms across shocks becomes equal to the
stationary distribution. Hence, an initial distribution that differs from
the ergodic distribution and a low persistent parameter increases the
chances of the model of getting the right age dependence. We cali-
brate the stochastic process so that the model can reproduce the main
investment facts of U.S. firms.
Besides Cooley and Quadrini (2001), a number of authors have
tried to explain the relation between size, age and firm dynamics aris-
ing from persistent idiosyncratic shocks to firms’ production technol-
ogy or from learning about the technology. This literature includes
the models studied by Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Campbell
and Fisher (2000), Alburquerque and Hopenhayn (2002), Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2006). These
models can generate an unconditional dependence of the firm dynam-
ics on size and age. In other words, as Cooley and Quadrini (2001) in-
dicated, without conditioning on age, the firm dynamics are negatively
related to its size, and without conditioning on size, the firm dynamics
are negatively related to the firm’s age. However, they cannot account
simultaneously for the conditional dependence on both size and age.
My paper is also related to the earlier work of Castro, Clementi and
Corbae (2005). Their paper tries to discriminate between two models
of firm dynamics: (i) a learning model (symmetric and incomplete in-
formation) and (ii) a moral hazard model (asymmetric information).
They assess whether informational frictions can successfully explain
the conditional moments of firm dynamics in a model that also in-
corporates fixed and convex adjustment costs. Boyarchenko (2006)
constructs a model of a competitive industry equilibrium refining the
work of Dixit and Pindyck (1996) to study the implications of capital
irreversibilities in continuous time where investment is made in several
stages.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section (2) we
describe the model and derive the conditions to find the stationary
distribution. Section (3) presents the calibration and the computation
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of the model. In Section (4) I show the unconditional moments of
firms’ dynamics. Section (5) describes the main result of the paper,
the size and age dependence. Finally, in Section(6) we conclude.
2 Model
The environment is a simplified version of the model developed by
Hopenhayn (1992) augmented to include capital accumulation and
adjustment costs. The only source of uncertainty for firms currently
in operation is the specific productivity shock. Incumbent firms max-
imize expected present value of discounted profits and in every period
decide the optimal production plan. The framework described below
is designed for the purpose of studying a competitive economy that
is in a stationary or long-run equilibrium. In this equilibrium some
firms will be undergoing change over time, with some of the expanding,
others contracting, some exiting the market and others starting up.
Despite all these changes at the level of the individual firm, aggregate
variables will be constant over time.
The firm4 produces output yt per time period with a production
technology
yt = f(st, kt, nt) = stkαt n
γ
t , (1)
with α ∈ (0, 1), γ ∈ (0, 1), α + γ < 1, where st is the idiosyncratic
productivity shock, kt is the stock of capital that the firm employs in
period t and nt is the labor input. Realizations of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock s take values in the set S ≡ {s1, . . . , sns} with ns
finite. The process of st is assumed to follow a First Order Markov
Process with transition matrix Π(s′|s) and to be iid across firms. This
implies that there is no uncertainty over the aggregate state of the
economy even though there is uncertainty at the individual level. De-
note pis′,s = Pr(st+1 = s′|st = s) the probability of receiving s′ in
period t+ 1 given that period t shock is equal to s. For each value of
s, the vector Π(·|s) represents the distribution of future values of the
shock, s′. It is assumed (as Cooley and Quadrini (2001)) that active
firms face a probability of receiving a shock st = 0 denoted by pix.
Moreover, once st reaches this value there is zero probability that st
will receive a positive value in the future. Given these assumptions it
4Through the paper we consider single-unit firms, i.e. plants/establishments that are
firms. See footnote 1.
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is natural to identify a zero value for the productivity shock with the
death of a firm.
2.1 Incumbent Firm’s Problem
The operative profits of an active plant are given by
P (st, kt, nt;w) = f(kt, nt, st)− wnt (2)
After observing the productivity shock and making the labor de-
cision, every continuing plant decides the optimal level of investment
it = kt+1 − (1− δ)kt.
We normalize the price of new capital to 1 and denote the selling
price of capital by ps. Following the literature on plant dynamics,
we assume that to modify the level of capital the plant must incur in
adjustment costs. The function g(kt, kt+1) captures the presence of
these costs and is defined as follows:
g(kt, kt+1;w) =
{
(1− λ)P (kt, nt, st;w) + ψ2
(
it
kt
)2
kt, if it 6= 0,
0, if it = 0;
For values of it 6= 0, the first term in g(kt, kt+1) captures the
disruption costs associated with the installation of new capital. A
fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of the operative profits is lost in the period of
adjustment. Empirical studies (see for example Power (1998) and
Sakellaris (2001)) provide evidence that plant productivity is lower
during periods of large investment. Note that ceteris paribus, invest-
ment rates are lower in periods of low productivity. The last term is
the traditional convex adjustment cost.
The establishment’s objective is to choose the optimal level of in-
vestment. The timing within period t for a plant that produced in
period t− 1 is as follows:
(i) The exit shock is realized. If the firm has to exit, it collects what
it is left from the used capital and stops producing for ever.
(ii) If not, the idiosyncratic productivity level is realized.
(iii) Active plants, decide the optimal level of labor input. Later on
the plant makes the investment decision and receives profits net
of adjustment costs.
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For any firm with s ∈ S the optimal level of labor input solves the
following problem:
R(k, s;w) = max
n
{
skαnγ − wn
}
(3)
where R(k, s;w) denotes the operative return of the firm. The solution
implies that the optimal labor choice at state (s, k) is:
n(s, k;w) =
[γskα
w
]1/(1−γ)
(4)
Thus, the return function of the plant, R(k, s), after choosing the
optimal level of labor is:
R(k, s;w) ≡ P (k, n(k, s;w), s;w),
⇒ R(k, s;w) = skαn(k, s;w)γ − wn(k, s;w)
= akθ, (5)
where a = (s/wγ)
1
1−γ
[
γ
γ
1−γ − γ 11−γ
]
and θ = α1−γ < 1.
Following Lucas (1978), I call θ the span of control parameter of
a plants manager. Alternatively, I can assume that these properties
derive from the monopolistic nature of the competitive environment
where the firm faces a downward-sloping demand function. Now, for
a given wage rate w, we can write the recursive problem of the active
plant as follows:
V (k, s;w) = max
{
V b(k, s;w), V s(k, s;w), V i(k, s;w)
}
(6)
where V b(k, s;w) represents the value of “buying” more capital, V s(k, s;w)
corresponds to the value of “selling” capital and finally V i(k, s;w), in-
action, is the value of keeping the depreciated capital stock for the
future period.
The value of buying capital is:
V b(k, s;w) = max
k′∈(k(1−δ),k¯]
{
R(k, s;w)− i− g(k, k′) (7)
+
1
1 + r
[
(1− pix)
∑
s′
V (k′, s′;w)Π(s, s′) + pixpsk′
]}
.
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The value of selling capital is:
V s(k, s;w) = max
k′∈[0,k(1−δ))
{
R(k, s;w)− psi− g(k, k′) (8)
+
1
1 + r
[
(1− pix)
∑
s′
V (k′, s′;w)Π(s, s′) + pixpsk′
]}
.
where ps ≤ 1 can be though as the selling price of capital.
Finally the value of inaction is given by:
V i(k, s;w) = R(k, s;w) +
1
1 + r
[
(1− pix)
∑
s′
V (k(1− δ), s′;w)Π(s, s′) + pixpsk(1− δ)
]
. (9)
Note that in this last case the future value of capital is given by
the depreciated capital stock after production in the current period.
2.2 Entry Decision.
I assume that there is a continuum of ex-ante identical potential en-
trants in each period. Entrants incur in a one time fixed cost κe
denominated in units of output. The price of capital at the entry
stage is denoted by ce. Each potential entrant receives its initial shock
from a continuous distribution ν(se). The size and the distribution of
entrants will play an important role in the dynamics of firms. The
determinants of this relation will be explained in more detail later.
It is assumed that in this economy there is free entry. The timing
of events before entry is as follows:
(1) The potential entrant observes the costs of creating a new firm
and then decides to enter or not.
(2) If he decides to enter, the entrepreneur pays the entry cost and
makes the initial investment ke, where ke is the solution to:
max
k′
{
1
1 + r
∑
s′
V (k′, s′;w)ν(s′)− cek′ − κe
}
. (10)
For future reference we can define the value of creating a firm
for a given wage rate w as
V e(ke;w) =
1
1 + r
∑
s′
V (ke, s′;w)ν(s′)− ceke − κe. (11)
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In equilibrium, new firms will enter and the wage rate will adjust until
the expected discounted profits net of entry cost is at most zero, that
is until:
V e(ke;w) ≤ 0. (12)
If this condition holds with equality an equilibrium with positive
measure of entrants will exist.
For a given wage rate w, by the properties of the value function
that solves problem (6), the solution to (11) exists and it is unique.
The wage rate is endogenously determined in equilibrium to satisfy
condition (12). The entry of new firms induce changes in prices and
in the value of the firm until there are no gains from creating a new
firm.
Problem (6), stated above, has a unique solution and can be solved
numerically. It can be shown that the value functions are bounded,
continuous and concave. We will focus our attention into the station-
ary distribution to study the long run properties of the model with
adjustment costs. The stationary equilibrium implies a size and age
distribution of firms. We provide conditions under which the empirical
regularities hold.
2.3 Stationary Distribution and Aggregates
The only uncertainty in the model is generated by the idiosyncratic
productivity shocks. At each point in time t the economy is char-
acterized by a measure of firms Γt(k, s, j;w) for each level of capital
stock k ∈ K = [0, k¯], productivity shocks s ∈ S = {s1, . . . , sns} and
age of the firms j ∈ Υ = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. A discussion of the definition
of the set K is in order. We will look for a stationary measure of
firms, and this requires that firms never accumulate capital beyond
some endogeneously determined level k¯. Intuitively the value of k¯ is
where the decision rule k′(k, sns) crosses the 45◦ line, provided that
the optimal capital accumulation rule is an increasing function of s.
Conditions under which firms optimally decide to do this are given in
the quantitative section.
With a positive probability of receiving s = 0 in any given period,
the expected age of exit is finite. If we let the measure of firms at age
j be given by µj , then µj+1 = (1 − pix)µj , where the measure µ0 is
given and corresponds to the mass of new entrants.
Let B(K) and B(Υ) be the Borel σ−algebra of K and Υ respec-
tively, and P(S) the power set of S. Define X = K × S × Υ. Let
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X = B(K) × P(S) × B(Υ) and M be the set of all finite measures
over the measurable space (X,X ).
The law of motion5 of Γt(k, s, j) is given by:
Γt+1 = Ht(Γt), (13)
where the function Ht can be written explicitly as:
a. For all T such that 1 /∈ T :
Γt+1(K × S ×T ) =
∫
Pt((k, s, j);K × S ×T ) Γt(dk× ds× dj),
(14)
where
Pt((k, s, j);K × S × T ) =
{
pi(s′|s)(1− pix) if k′(k, s) ∈ K
0 else
b.
Γt+1(K × S × {1}) =
{
ν(s)E if ke ∈ K
0 else
where E corresponds to the mass of entrants.
The explicit formulation of the law of motion for the distribution
has to be divided in two parts in order to capture the assumption that
entrant firms start their lives with capital value ke.
This paper focuses on the study of the invariant distribution of
firms denoted by Γ∗. We find Γ∗ as the fixed point of this mapping,
that is, Γ∗ = H(Γ∗). We normalize the measure of firms to one. The
mass of entrants, E, will coincide with the mass of firms that exit the
market in equilibrium. In this way the total mass of firms is constant.
Stockey and Lucas (1989) stated the necessary conditions for conver-
gence of the measure Γ. The properties of the stochastic process and
the decision rules give rise to a mapping from the current distribution
to the next period measure of firms. An invariant measure of firms Γ∗
exists. Moreover, Γ∗ is unique, and the sequence of measures gener-
ated by the transition function, {Hn(Γ0)}∞n=0 converges weakly to Γ∗
from any arbitrary Γ0.
This result will allow me to calibrate the model using the stationary
distribution and the moments from data on the U.S. manufacturing
5The dependence on the wage rate w is dropped for notational simplicity.
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sector to then test the model against the conditional size and age
dependence.
With the definition of the stationary distribution of active firms at
hand it is straightforward to characterize the aggregate quantities in
this economy. The aggregate supply of goods is given by
Y (Γ;w) =
∑
j
µj
∫
R(k, s;w)Γ(dk, ds, j), (15)
total labor demand is
N(Γ;w) =
∑
j
µj
∫
n(k, s;w)Γ(dk, ds, j), (16)
aggregate investment is
I(Γ;w) =
∑
j
µj
∫
[ι{i>0}(i) + psι{i<0}(i)]i(k, s;w)Γ(dk, ds, j).
where ι{y}(x) is the indicator function that takes value 1 if the condi-
tion y is true.
2.4 Stationary Equilibrium
Definition 1 (RSE). A Recursive Stationary Equilibrium (RSE) con-
sists of a wage rate w∗ a distribution of incumbent firms Γ∗(k, s, j;w∗)
and functions V (k, s;w∗), k′(k, s;w∗) and n(k, s;w∗) such that:
1. Given w∗, V (k, s;w∗), k′(k, s;w∗), n(k, s;w∗) solve the firm’s prob-
lem.
2. The stationary distribution is such that Γ∗(k, s, j;w∗) = H∗[Γ∗(k, s, j;w∗)]
3. The free entry condition is satisfied: V e(ke;w∗) = 0
4. The mass of entrants is E∗ = pixΓ∗(k, s, j;w∗).
These are standard conditions for a stationary equilibrium. The
set of prices and functions are such that they solve the firm’s problem.
Moreover, the evolution of the distribution, that reproduces itself in
each period is consistent with decision rules and the evolution of the
shocks. The mass of entrants equals the number of firms that exit in
each period to keep the total measure of firms constant.
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3 Matching Investment Moments
In this section I parameterized the model to match the investment
dynamics observed in the U.S. manufacturing sector. I assume that
a model period is one year. To solve the firm’s problem I approxi-
mate the value function using cubic splines and the optimal capital
accumulation is obtained by a root finding algorithm. I assume that
the firm’s idiosyncratic shocks (defined as in equation (5)) follow an
autoregressive form given by
ln(ai,t) = ρa ln(ai,t−1) + ut (17)
with ut ∼ N(0, σu). Denote the standard deviation of log(a) by σa.
I also assume that the log of entrant’s productivity shocks, ln(ae),
are distributed N(0, σu). To solve the model I will approximate the
distribution of the idiosyncratic shocks using the method proposed by
Tauchen and Hussey (1991) as explained in Adda and Cooper (2004,
page 56). The parameters of the productivity process can be chosen to
match the profile of US firms. They have implications for the degree
of persistence and dispersion in the distribution of firms. The size
of entrants is determined by the entry costs and the distribution of
entry shocks. The general pattern observed is that entering firms are
substantially smaller on average than existing or continuing firms and
that organization learning appears to continue over a period of at least
10 years.
The set of parameters necessary in order to compute the model
are:
Θ = {δ, α, γ, ρa, σa, λ, ps, φ, κe, ce}, (18)
where δ is the depreciation rate, α is the capital share in the firms
production technology, γ is the corresponding labor share, ρs and
σs are the parameters that define the idiosyncratic shocks, λ is the
parameter that captures the disruption costs associated with capital
adjustment, ps is the relative price of used capital to new capital,
φ is the weight in the convex adjustment cost, κe and ce are the
corresponding fixed and variable entry cost.
The exercise consists of choosing the parameters in order to match
the long-run moments from the U.S. economy and the investment
dynamics. We set the risk free rate to 4 percent that corresponds to the
average yearly real return on a five year T-bill. I set the depreciation
rate to be 0.11 to match the value reported in previous studies of firm
and plant dynamics. Also, the labor-share parameter γ = 0.64 is in
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turn selected to replicate the labor share in the NIPA. The number of
grid points for a is chosen to be equal to 10.
The exit probability is calibrated to pix = 0.045 because in the
sample analyzed by Evans (1987), the average probability of exit is
about 4.5 percent.
To find the parameters that are left it is necessary to solve the
model. Even though each parameter it is associated with one moment
in the data, the set of moments and parameters are jointly determined.
The calibration of the capital share in equation (5) is not straightfor-
ward in the presence of adjustment costs that interact with the profit
function. Following Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) a two step pro-
cedure is used to calibrate the value of α that is consistent with the
observed curvature of the production function at the plant level, θ, in
the data. Using the assumption of the process of productivity shocks,
equation (17), taking logs of the revenue function, equation (5) and
quasi-differencing yields
log(Rt) = ρa log(Rt−1)− ρaθ log(kt−1) + θ log(kt) + ut. (19)
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) estimated this equation via gen-
eralized method of moments using a complete set of time dummies
and lagged and twice-lagged capital and twice-lagged profits as in-
struments. The data come from the Longitudinal Research Database
consisting of approximately 7000 large manufacturing plants that were
in operation between 1972 and 1988. The parameter θ is estimated
to be 0.592. The two step procedure consists of setting α, ρa and σa
at some value and then calibrate the other parameters to match the
corresponding moments. After this is done, the model is simulated to
estimate equation (19) to recover the value of θ and ρa that is consis-
tent with active establishments in the model. If the estimates coincide
with the values of the parameters in the actual data I stop, if not I
update α and repeat the process. The parameters ρa and σa are taken
directly from the Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) estimation with dis-
ruption costs and after controlling for a time fixed effect6. After this
6Recall that
a = (s/wγ)
1
1−γ
[
γ
γ
1−γ − γ 11−γ
]
.
Rearranging some terms we can write log(a) = (1−γ)−1 log(s)+D, where D is a constant
that depends on the wage rate w and the labor share γ. Replacing in equation (17) we get
log(st+1) = D(1− γ)(ρa − 1) + ρa log(st) + et.
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procedure has converged the capital share α is calibrated to 0.2186
(Fuentes, Gilchrist and Rysman (2006), Gomes (2001) and Hennessy
and Whited (2005) obtained similar estimates7 in related studies).
The parameters associated with the adjustment cost function (λ
and φ), the selling price of capital (ps), the entrants’ price of capital
(ce) and the fixed entry cost (κe) are chosen so plants in the stationary
distribution display the patterns that Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)
(investment facts) and Dunne, et. al. (1988) (entrants main charac-
teristics) documented. The main features of Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006) findings could be summarized as follows: first, plants exhibit
significant inaction in terms of capital adjustment (8.10 % of the total
observations have investment rates of less than 1% in absolute value).
Second, periods of inaction are complemented by periods of rather
intensive adjustment of the capital stock. Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006) (and many others) define a spike as an investment episode in
excess of 20 %. Negative spikes are found in 1.8 percent of the ob-
servations. The correlation between investment rates and profitability
shocks is 0.143 in the data. The study of Dunne et. al. (1988) reports
that entrants that create a firm by building a new plant have market
share8 of 7.9% and their relative size9 is 28.35% of the average firm.
This study summarizes the patterns of firm entry, growth and exit
in the four-digit U.S. manufacturing industries over the period 1963-
1982. Entrants are disaggregated into new firms, existing firms that
diversify into an industry by opening new production facilities, and
existing firms that enter by altering the mix of outputs they produce.
The full set of parameters values is reported in Table (3). The sell-
ing price of capital is smaller than the price of buying new capital by
approximately 4%. This wedge between the prices is in part respon-
sible for the inaction that the model generates. The disruption cost
is around 15% of current profits in periods of adjustment. Given the
Hence, after this transformation we can recover the process of idiosyncratic shocks in the
model where et ∼ N(0, σu(1− γ)).
7This parameter value also produces an equilibrium capital-output ratio consistent with
the US economy when the empirical counterpart for capital is identified with plant and
equipment and is associated in NIPA with nonresidential investment.
8Their study is based on Census data that is available every 5 years. For that reason
the market share in the model corresponds to the ratio of total output produced by firms
of age 1 through 5 over total output of older firms.
9The relative size is computed as the ratio of average output of entrants over average
output of older firms (see previous footnote).
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value of φ, firms with high enough levels of capital, will find it optimal
to reduce the scale of production and do not wait until the deprecia-
tion process takes all the excess. Moreover, given the combination of
adjustment costs present in the model, the firms will wait until the
demand shocks are high enough to increase the capital stock up to the
optimal level and we will observe the bursts of investment that are
documented in the literature. To have a better sense of the magni-
tude of this parameters, the average adjustment cost paid relative to
the capital stock was 4% in the stationary distribution. The value of
κe implies that in equilibrium the total entry cost paid is around 3%
of average capital of active plants. The calibrated value of ce is 3.2
and implies that the cost of buying new capital is around three times
of the price active plants face.
Parameter Value
Interest Rate r 0.04
Depreciation Rate δ 0.11
Labor Share γ 0.64
Exit Probability pix 0.045
Autocorrelation ρa 0.885
Standard Deviation σa 0.64
Capital Share α 0.2186
Disruption Cost λ 0.84
Selling Price ps 0.96
Convex Cost Func. Parameter φ 0.25
Entrant’s Price ce 3.2
Table 1: Model parameters
4 Firm Dynamics and Stationary dis-
tribution
In this section we describe the firm dynamics generated by the cali-
brated model of adjustment costs at the stationary distribution. The
intuition behind firm’s behavior is provided in Figure 1 where you can
observe the value of the firm, the optimal investmet decision rule, the
labor choice and Tobin’s Q for different combinations of firm’s capital
16
size and idiosyncratic shocks.
The value of the firm is strictly increasing an concave on firm’s
size (capital). As a result of decreasing returns to scale, the marginal
increase in value is decreasing in k. This implies that for low values of
k the marginal benefit of investment is higher and the firm will prefer
to invest in new capital. On the contrary, everything else equal, for
high values of k it will prefer to sell some of its capital stock and
reduce the scale of production.
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Figure 1: Firm Behavior
Figure 1.b shows the optimal capital accumulation of the firm for
different values of s. We observe that k′(k, s) is strictly increasing in
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k and s. For low values of k, k′(k, s) > k(1− δ) that is, i > 0. There
are middle range values of k where k′(k, s) coincides with k(1 − δ).
In this case the combination of k and s are such that the firm prefers
not to invest. Finally, for high values of k, investment is negative,
that is the firm is selling some portion of its capital at price ps when
the marginal product of one extra unit of capital is less than the
marginal benefit of selling it. This pattern can be associated with two
investment thresholds: one that defines when to stop investing and
set k′ = (1 − δ)k and another that determines when to start selling
capital. This thresholds are increasing in the productivity shock of
the firm for a given current’s capital stock k. Another feature that we
can observe from this figure is the endogenous determination of k¯.
Small firms will invest in new capital as they move from low to
high productivity shocks, that is firms increase their capital stock
when their future prospects increase. Firm’s behavior imply that the
investment rates of firms is sensitive to cash flows even after controlling
for the future profitability of the firm and this sensitivity is greater for
smaller firms (see section 5.1 below for a better explanation). As it
was pointed in the literature before, it is possible to obtain cash-flows
effects even in the absence of financial frictions. The labor decision
rules is also depicted in Figure (1). This decision rule comes directly
from equation (4). Firm’s labor choice is strictly increasing in its
capital and its productivity shock.
Now I turn to the properties of firms’ dynamics in the stationary
distribution. I calibrated the model mainly to match the moments
reported by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006) and the distribution of
entrants presented in Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988, page 504).
The histogram of investment rates that emerges from this economy is
reported in Figure(2). Clearly, there is a mass of firms around zero
investment as we observe in the data (see Figure 1 in Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) for example) and the distribution has fat tails.
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Figure 2: Model’s Distribution of Investment Rates
The moments from the data and those from the model in the sta-
tionary distribution are reproduced in Table (2). As it is possible to
see from this table, at the calibrated parameter values the model does
a good job in reproducing the investment moments.
Moment Data Model
Spike Rate: Negative Investment (%) 1.80 1.78
Inaction Rate (%) 8.10 8.12
Correlation(I/K, a) 0.143 0.143
Entrant Relative Size (%) 28.35 28.33
Entrant Market Share (%) 7.90 7.84
Table 2: Data and Model Investment Moments.
As displayed in Figure (3), I also explore the properties of the
growth rate of capital, profit’s rate, the standard deviation of the
growth rate and job reallocation rate dynamics to show that they are
consistent with the observations in the U.S. economy. These uncon-
ditional moments are computed by averaging them according to the
stationary distribution of each class of firms. At a given age, firms
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differ in two dimensions: their capital stock and their productivity
shock. This heterogeneity is the driving force of all my results. The
key properties of the behavior of firms that can be summarized as
follows:
• Small and younger firms growth faster (Panels (a) and (b)).
• Profits rates are negatively correlated with size and age (Panels
(c) and (d)).
• The variability of firm growth decreases with firm age and size
(Panels (g) and (h)).
• Small and younger firms have higher job reallocation rates (Pan-
els (e) and (f)).
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Figure 3: Firm’s Moments and Invariant Distribution
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The growth rate of capital is plotted in Panels (a) and (b). To
understand why investment rates are a decreasing function of capital,
it is necessary to understand the trade-off that firms face when de-
ciding the optimal level of capital for the future. On one hand, more
capital allows them to increase the production scale and increase their
expected profits; on the other hand the expansion of the production
scale combined with the capital irreversibility implies a higher expo-
sure to bad productivity shock. Naturally, this is a result of the dimin-
ishing returns to scale at the establishment level. At higher levels of
capital the expected profits of increasing the size of the firm decreases.
The investment behavior will be important in explaining the relation
between growth rates and cash flows. The unconditional dependence
of firms growth rates on their age comes from the fact that firms are
born small on average. As they become older they also become bigger
and the intuition is similar to the unconditional dependence of firms’
growth rate of size.
Panels (c) and (d) plot the profit rates as a function of firm’s size
and firm’s age. This property derives also from the decreasing return
to scale production function and the optimal capital accumulation
rule mentioned above. The higher profitability of smaller firms im-
plies that they have a greater incentive to reinvest profits that relates
to the ivestment rates observed in Panel (a). Similarly, the relation be-
tween panel (d) and panel (b) is the driving force of the unconditional
dependence of profit rates on age.
The standard deviation of growth is also a decreasing function of
size (except for a range of small firms and age (see Panels (e) and (f)).
Smaller (and younger) firms behavior are more affected by productiv-
ity shocks that bigger (and older) firms.
Panels (g) and (h) displays the job creation rate defined as the
rate of employment gains summed over all plants that expand at age
or size category (see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh (1996)) and the
job destruction rate defined as the rate of employment losses summed
over all plants that contract or shut down. As pointed before, the
labor decision is increasing in capital, so the dynamics of firms’ growth
stated above have a direct effect over the job creation rate of labor.
The model is capable of generating the unconditional dependence of
firms’ reallocation on size and age. Job reallocation, i.e. the sum of
job creation and destruction is decreasing in size and age; however,
while it is possible to observe that job creation is decreasing in size
and age, job destruction is increasing for young and small firms.
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Finally, Figure (4) plots the joint distribution of firms over size
(capital stock) and age. New entrants are of the same size; however
they make different investment decisions according to their productiv-
ity shocks in their first period of life. In the model studied by Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) entrants are always of the highest productivity
shock. We observe a concentration of small and young firms. That
is another feature of the model that matches the data. In the U.S.
manufacturing sector, more than 45 of new plants exit within 20 years.
Furthermore, we observe that younger firms are smaller in average.
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Figure 4: Stationary Distribution of Firms over Size and Age.
In summary, once calibrated to match the investment features of
U.S. establishments, the model is capable to generate the uncondi-
tional size and age dependence of firms’ dynamics. Moreover, the
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model is consistent with the evidence that relates investment rates
and cash flows. Now is time to see if the model with adjustment costs
and idiosyncratic productivity shocks is also able to generate simulta-
neously the conditional size and age dependence.
5 Size and Age Dependence.
The analysis conducted in the previous section showed that a model
driven by productivity shocks, some level of capital irreverisibility with
entry and exit calibrated to the US data captures many of the salient
qualitative features of industry dynamics. In particular, higher invest-
ment rates, higher profits, higher volatility and higher job reallocation
are observed for small and young firms. However, the main point of
the paper is to demonstrate that this model is also able to account for
the conditional age and size dependence pointed by previous studies
like Evans (1987), Hall (1987) and Davis et al. (1996) that Cooley
and Quadrini (2001) describe as arising from financial frictions.
Previous models of industry dynamics that consider investment
decisions were not able to generate the age and size dependence be-
cause, once you control for the size of the firm, age becomes irrelevant
in differentiating the dynamics of small and large establishments: the
dependence on age derives only from the fact that young firms are
in average smaller. In those models there exists only one dimension
of heterogeneity, and thus once you fix age or size, firms are all alike
independently of their history. In our model, there exists two dimen-
sions of heterogeneity, because once you condition on size (capital
stock depends on the previous history), firms could also be different
in the productivity composition. Furthermore, once you condition in
the level of the idiosyncratic shock, firms differ in their size and this
generates different patterns for the capital stock. To analyze how
the model behaves I create a panel of firms from the stationary dis-
tribution10, and I conduct an econometric test to verify the relation
between growth rates, profits rates, job creation and job destruction
with the size and the age of the firms. Specifically, for each of this
four variables, denoted by x, I run the following regression11 on the
simulated data
xj,t = a0 + a1 ln(sizej,t) + a2 ln(agej,t) + ²t. (20)
10I simulate 10,000 firms for 2,000 periods and take the last 200 periods.
11I also tried a specification with higher order terms and the results were similar.
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The subscript j denotes firm j and t corresponds to the time period.
As before, firm’s size is measure with the stock of capital. The results
of this test are displayed in Table (3).
Growth Rate Profit Rate Job Creation Job Destruction
a0 2.0872 0.7558 0.2800 0.2785
(1.32e− 03) (2.11e− 04) (2.32e− 04) (5.85e− 03)
a1 -0.2806 -0.0371 -0.0096 -0.0463
(4.87e− 05) (9.29e− 05) (1.49e− 06) (1.73e− 05)
a2 -0.3350 -0.1070 -0.0431 -0.0391
(1.18e− 04) (5.67e− 05) (7.24e− 05) (8.26e− 06)
Table 3: Model Predictions (Std Dev in parenthesis)
The elasticities of growth, profit rates, job creation and job de-
struction with respect to size and age are negative. Therefore, firm
growth profit rates, job creation and job destruction decrease with
firm size when firm age is held constant and decrease with firm age
when size is held constant. Every decision of the firm depends on
its level of capital stock as well as its productivity shock. Two firms
with the same productivity shock will decide to invest, disinvest or
continue with the same scale of production according to their level of
k. Different values of k reflects the different histories. Similarly, two
firms with the same scale of production will invest different amounts
of capital according to their current value of s. The heterogeneous be-
havior of firms in the stationary distribution, introduces the age and
size dependence.
The conditional size dependence derives from the same factors that
affected the unconditional relation between firms’ evolution and size.
The higher growth rates of small firms is related with their higher
profit rates and higher value of Tobin’s q. This also introduces a neg-
ative relation with the rates of job reallocation (creation and destruc-
tion). As explained in the previous section, this behavior is directly
connected with the decreasing returns to scale production function.
Smaller firms perceive a higher marginal benefit of investing in new
capital and consequently their growth rates are higher. A similar in-
tuition applies for the rest of the variables.
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The age dependence is driven by the heterogenous technological
composition of firms of different ages classes. Conditional on their
size, firms with higher productivity shocks experience higher rates of
profits than firms with lower values of s. Conditional on the size of the
firms, the distribution across productivity shocks differs as we move
from younger to older firms. As a result, younger firms grow faster
and face higher rates of job creation and failure than older firms.
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Figure 5: Size Dependence (Firms’ Dynamics Conditional on Age).
Using the results from Table 3, in Figures (5) and (6) I plot the
growth rate of firms, their profit rate, job creation and job destruction
rates as functions of the firms’ size (conditional on age) and as a
function of age (conditional on size) respectively. We can conclude
that in the stationary distribution all variables are decreasing in the
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size and in the age of the firm, even after controlling, respectively for
age and size.
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Figure 6: Age Dependence (Firms’ Dynamics Conditional on Size).
The heterogeneity just described plays the most important role in
generating the age dependence in the economy. This heterogeneity is
derived from the distribution of shocks from where entrants draw their
shock in the first period but more importantly from the persistence
that idiosyncratic shocks display in the model. If the shocks present a
high autocorrelation the heterogenous composition is maintained for
long periods, that is if ρa is close to one, the distribution of entrants
ν(s) will shape the distribution of active firms for a long time. In
the limit, if ρa → 1 the distribution over shocks of active firms will
be similar to ν(s). On the contrary, as ρa → 0 only the distribution
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of very young firms will remain close to their initial distribution. To
make it clearer consider the following example: assume that there are
no disruption costs associated with adjusting the capital stock and
pix = 0. Then, the Euler equation of an active firm after substituting
the envelope condition is
− 1− gk′(k, k′) + 1(1 + r)
[∑
s′
Π(s′|s)Rk′(s′, k′) + (1− δk′) + gk(k′, k′′)
]
= 0
⇒ 1 + gk′(k, k′) = 1(1 + r)
[∑
s′
Π(s′|s)Rk′(s′, k′) + (1− δk′) + gk(k′, k′′)
]
(21)
This is the usual capital accumulation equation of a firm where the
left hand side represent the marginal costs and the left hand side
represents the marginal benefits of investment. Consider the extreme
case where shocks are iid and distributed according to the stationary
distribution corresponding with Π. Denote this distribution with Π∗.
In this world only the shocks of entrants will depend on ν(s). For any
firm with age greater or equal to 2, the shocks will be drawn from Π∗.
Then the capital accumulation equation becomes
1 + gk′(k, k′) =
1
(1 + r)
[∑
s′
Π∗(s′)Rk′(s′, k′) + (1− δk′) + gk(k′, k′′)
]
(22)
that is independent of s. Thus, once you condition on size, the capital
accumulation of the firm is independent of the shock and then firm
with different ages will behave as identical firms conditional on the
capital stock. The distribution of firms for active plants that are not
entrants is the same across shocks.
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Figure 7: Distribution of firms over shocks for different ages
If you add some level of persistence, not only the decision of the
firm will depend on the idiosyncratic shock, but also the distribution
of firms across shocks will differ for firms with different ages. The
optimal capital investment is the solution to problem (6). The measure
of active firms with a particular shock will approach Π∗(s) as you
consider older firms. Figure 7 display the distribution over shocks
for different age values. In the iid case the differences in technology
composition disappears after the first period. In the persistent case,
these differences are present for firms with more than 20 years of life.
In Figure 7 each line correspond to a different age and in the
iid case only two lines can be distinguished. After the first year of
production, the distribution of firms over s is the same across firms
with different ages. For the case where the shocks are persistent, the
technological differences prevail for a long time. An important point is
worth to mention here. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) needed to assume
that the entrants were of a particular technology type to generate the
right sign in the age dependence (see Cooley and Quadrini (2001) page
1303). In our model, the size of the entrants as well as the entry barrier
are calibrated to match the facts observed in the U.S. manufacturing
sector.
5.1 Evidence on Financial Constraints
Cooley and Quadrini (2001) motivated the introduction of financial
constraints in a standard model of firm dynamics pointing to the the
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relation between investment rates and Tobin’s Q and cash flows. How-
ever, there are theoretical arguments and empirical evidence showing
that investment-cash flows sensitivities are not good indicators of fi-
nancing constraints or financial frictions. Cooper and Ejarque (2001)
find that the sensitivity of investment rates to cash flows does neces-
sarily comes from a model with financial constraints. They estimate
different models of capital investment to match the “Q-theory” regres-
sions and obtain a better fit with a model with no financial frictions.
Moreover, Erickson and Whited (2000) and Gomes (2001) argue that
the relation between investment rates and Tobin’s q comes from mea-
surement error. In my model, the monotonicity of the investment
function imply that investment of firms is sensitive to cash flows gen-
erating the significant relation obtain in the data. To show this I
simulate my model economy and apply the same econometric proce-
dures that previous studies pointing to financial constraints used. The
estimated model takes the following form
ij,t
kt
= a0 + a1E[qj,t+1] + a2
pij,t
kj,t
+ ²t (23)
where the subscript j denotes firm j and t corresponds to the time
period. A significant coefficient a2 in this type of regression motivated
the inclusion of financial constraints. The results from my model are
displayed in Table (4).
Coefficient Value Std. Error
a1 0.087 1.92e-06
a2 2.95 5.71e-04
Table 4: Model Predictions.
The values obtained are in line with the estimated coefficients re-
ported by Gomes (2001) and Cooper and Ejarque (2001). The goal of
this exercise was to understand the “cash-flow effect” and the relation
with financial constraints. We observe that a model with no financial
frictions and only some level of capital irreversibility also generates
a significant “cash flow” coefficient. This is not an argument against
financial frictions. I do not question the existence or importance of
these constraints for investment decisions. Nevertheless, this result
cast serious doubt on the common interpretation of cash-flow effects
as evidence in favor of financing constraints.
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Hence, the integration of a basic model of industry dynamics with
non-convex adjustment costs and entry and exit is able to capture most
of the stylized facts about the investment behavior and the growth of
firms. In particular, we are able to reproduce the conditional age
and size dependence that the empirical literature pointed before and
that previous models of investment and firms’ dynamics were not able
to obtain. In contrast with previous models were financial frictions
were necessary to address this question we developed a model were
the friction present is the adjustment costs of capital accumulation.
6 Conclusion
Models of firm and industry dynamics that consider entry and exit
were unable to account simultaneously for the conditional dependence
of firm growth, standard deviation of growth and job reallocation on
size and age. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) pointed that one possible
explanation could be the introduction of financial frictions in an oth-
erwise standard model. They show that the integration of persistent
shocks and financial-market frictions allows the model to generate the
desired firm dynamics. In this paper, I find that a model of invest-
ment dynamics with adjustment costs that introduces entry and exit
can also account for the conditional size and age dependence.
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